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Abstract
The United States prides itself on being a champion of human rights and
pressures other countries to improve their human rights practices, and yet
appears less willing than other nations to embrace international human
rights treaties. Many commentators attribute this phenomenon to the par-
ticular historical context that existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s when
human rights treaties were ﬁrst being developed. These commentators
especially emphasize the race relations of the time, noting that some conser-
vatives resisted the developing human rights regime because they saw it as an
effort by the federal government to extend its authority to address racial seg-
regation and discrimination in the South. As this essay explains, the guarded
and qualiﬁed U.S. relationship with human rights treaties stems not only
from a particular moment in history but also is a product of more enduring,
and less obviously problematic, features of the U.S. constitutional system.
1. This essay considers the history of the U.S. relationship with international human
rights treaties. This relationship is sometimes described as being paradoxical or even
hypocritical, in that the United States prides itself on being a champion of human
rights and pressures other countries to improve their human rights practices, and yet
appears less willing than other nations to embrace international human rights trea-
ties. The United States did not begin to ratify any of the major human rights treaties
until the late 1980s, and it still has not ratiﬁed a number of them, including the
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Moreover, for the human rights
treaties that it has ratiﬁed, the United States has qualiﬁed its consent to the
treaties by attaching extensive reservations, understandings, and declarations, or
“RUDs”.
2. Many commentators attribute the complicated U.S. relationship with human
rights treaties to the particular historical context that existed in the late 1940s and
early 1950s when human rights treaties were ﬁrst being developed. These commen-
tators especially emphasize the race relations of the time, noting that some conser-
vatives in the United States resisted the developing human rights regime because
they saw it as an effort by the federal government to extend its authority to
address racial segregation and discrimination in the South.1 While this historical
claim is not inaccurate per se, it provides an incomplete picture in that it under-
emphasizes the Cold War fears that many people had at the time about the
spread of communism abroad and the threat of totalitarianism at home – concerns
that, fairly or unfairly, became linked to the developing human rights project. More
importantly, an emphasis on the particular historical context of the late 1940s and
early 1950s does not explain why the complicated U.S. relationship with human
rights treaties has persisted even after the end of racial segregation and after the
end of the Cold War. As I will discuss, the guarded and qualiﬁed U.S. relationship
to human rights treaties stems not only from a particular moment in history but also
is a product of more enduring, and less obviously problematic, features of the U.S.
constitutional system.
I. U.S. Commitment to Human Rights
3. The United States has long been committed to the idea that individuals have
rights that can be asserted against their own government. In announcing their sep-
aration from the British Empire in 1776, the colonies that became the United States
issued a Declaration of Independence that proclaimed that there were certain “self-
evident” truths. These truths were that “all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” [and] “[t]hat to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed”.2 These ideas would in turn become inﬂuential in
1 See, e.g., David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Michigan LR 1075, 1273-74 (2000);
Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking
in the United States, 117 Yale LJ 1236, 1303 (2008); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratiﬁcation of
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AJIL 341, 348 (1995).
2 The Declaration of Independence, paras. 2, 3 (U.S. 1776).
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many other countries.3 They also had continuing inﬂuence within the United States
as it gradually increased its own rights protections – most dramatically when it abol-
ished slavery during the American Civil War of the 1860s.4
4. The U.S. Constitution similarly embodies a commitment to human rights.
Shortly after adopting the original Constitution in the late 1780s, the United
States added ten amendments that are known as the Bill of Rights. These amend-
ments protect the right of individuals to, among other things, speak freely, practice
their religion, receive a fair trial, and receive just compensation if their property is
taken by the government. Later constitutional amendments, including amendments
added after the conclusion of the Civil War, added to these rights. In the modern
era, Congress has supplemented the constitutional rights with a wide variety of stat-
utory rights. Unlike the constitutional rights, modern statutory rights go beyond
negative protections against government abuse and include more positive protec-
tions such as a minimum wage, unemployment insurance, and a right to social
security payments upon retirement, although the United States is less expansive
in the area of economic and social rights than most other Western industrialized
countries.5
5. In addition to having signiﬁcant rights guarantees at home, the United States
often pressures other countries to improve their human rights practices. Pursuant to
a statutory directive, the U.S. State Department issues a detailed report every year
that assesses and critiques other countries’ human rights practices.6 The United
States also sometimes imposes economic sanctions on abusive regimes, such as
Burma. Occasionally it has even resorted to military force to stop human rights
abuses, such as with the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in the late
1990s. To be sure, the United States is often selective in seeking human rights
reform in other countries, as it balances its commitment to human rights against
other interests, such as the protection of national security and the promotion of
international trade. This balancing has long been evident, for example, in the
U.S. relationship with China.7 But this selectivity does not particularly distinguish
the United States from other countries (although the United States may be
3 See David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (2007).
4 President Abraham Lincoln frequently invoked the Declaration of Independence, both before
and during his presidency. See George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Bio-
graphy (1999).
5 See Michael Ignatieff, Introduction, in American Exceptionalism and Human Rights 11
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (“U.S. rights guarantees have been employed in the service
of a political tradition that has been consistently more critical of government, more insistent
on individual responsibility, and more concerned to defend individual freedom than the
European socialist, social democratic, or Christian democratic traditions.”).
6 See U.S. Dept. of State, “Human Rights Reports”, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/.
7 See, e.g., Robert S. Ross, China, in Richard N. Haass (ed.), Economic Sanctions and
American Diplomacy 18–19 (1998).
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unique in the extent to which it focuses on the human rights practices of other
nations).8
6. The U.S. emphasis on human rights was evident in the years leading up to the
modern international human rights movement. In early 1941, while war was being
waged in Europe and with the Great Depression still fresh in memory, President
Franklin Roosevelt articulated “four essential human freedoms” that should be
enjoyed by all peoples of the world: freedom of speech and expression, freedom
of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.9 Later, the United States
led the way in establishing the United Nations, one of the express purposes of
which is “to promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.10
The Charter of the United Nations also states that “[a]ll Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the
achievement of the[se] purposes”.11
7. After President Roosevelt’s death, his wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, served as the
ﬁrst chairperson of the United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights. In that
role, she was instrumental in helping to develop the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, a non-binding but inﬂuential resolution adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1948.12 The Universal Declaration, while embra-
cing many of the civil and political rights recognized in the U.S. Constitution,
also sets forth a variety of economic, social, and cultural rights. At the same
time, efforts were underway in the United Nations to develop a treaty against gen-
ocide, which President Truman signed and submitted to the Senate in 1949. It
was also envisioned that the Universal Declaration would be followed by a
Human Rights Covenant that would embody many of the same principles articu-
lated in the Declaration in a binding instrument. Proposals for additional human
rights treaties, such as a treaty addressing the political rights of women, would
soon follow.
8. This developing international human rights project became intensely contro-
versial in the United States. As part of this controversy, there were numerous pro-
posals introduced in the Senate in the 1950s to amend the U.S. Constitution to
limit the government’s treaty power. These proposals, which had the support of
the American Bar Association (ABA), are known collectively as the “Bricker
8 See Anu Bradford & Eric Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law (forthcom-
ing Harvard International Law Journal, 2010).
9 See Address of the President of the United States to Congress, January 6, 1941, 87 Cong.
Rec. 44, 46–47 (1941).
10 United Nations Charter, art. 1(3).
11 Id., art. 56.
12 See Mary Ann Glendon, AWorld Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (2001).
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Amendment” after their chief sponsor in the Senate, John Bricker of Ohio.13 It is
very difﬁcult to amend the U.S. Constitution – it takes a two-thirds vote in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives, and then approval from three-fourths
of the states. None of the Bricker Amendment proposals was adopted, although one
version came within a single vote of receiving two-thirds support in the Senate.14
II. Domestic Controversies
9. One element of the Bricker Amendment controversy concerned the race relations
of the time. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, racial segregation and discrimination
were common in the United States, and it was uncertain to what extent Congress
had the authority to regulate these practices. Constitutional litigation was also
being pursued in the courts, but it was unclear before the seminal Brown
v. Board of Education decision in 1954 how far the courts would go in disallowing
segregated public facilities, and, in any event, the equal protection guarantee of the
Constitution would not address discrimination by private businesses. Some conser-
vatives in the United States, especially in the South, were concerned that the
national government would use international human rights law to achieve civil
rights reform that was otherwise beyond the scope of either Congress’s authority
or what the Constitution mandated.
10. This concern was evident in debates over the Genocide Convention. The
Convention deﬁned genocide to include “[c]ausing . . . mental harm” to members
of a racial group if done with an intent to destroy the group, and conservatives
objected that this phrase could be construed to reach segregation laws. For
example, George Finch, the editor-in-chief of the American Journal of International
Law, asked: “Can it be successfully denied that segregation laws are susceptible of
being denounced as causing mental harm to all members of the group against
which such laws discriminate?”15 The deﬁnition of genocide also encompassed
acts done with an intent to destroy a racial group “in part”, leading some critics
to object that it could be construed to cover even isolated acts of racial violence.
For example, Arthur Schweppe, presenting the views of an ABA subcommittee,
stated critically that “it would be entirely reasonable to include race riots under
the present deﬁnition, and also lynching, if engaged in with intent to destroy
part of a group”.16
13 See Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisenhower’s Pol-
itical Leadership (1988).
14 This version would have simply required congressional implementation of executive agree-
ments and made clear that treaties that conﬂict with the Constitution would not be given
effect.
15 The Genocide Convention: Hearings Before A Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 81st Cong., at 217 (1950).
16 Id. at 201.
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11. In describing the U.S. relationship with human rights treaties, some com-
mentators focus almost exclusively on this historical connection with the unfortu-
nate race relations of the time.17 Another important part of the historical context,
however, was the Cold War backdrop. The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed
the Berlin Airlift, the establishment of a communist government in mainland
China that quickly allied itself with the Soviet bloc, and the invasion of South
Korea by Soviet-backed North Korean troops.18 It was also a time of high-level
Soviet espionage in the United States, resulting in widely publicized criminal
trials, such as the trial of Alger Hiss, a former State Department employee who
was convicted of perjury relating to his espionage activities, and of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted of passing nuclear secrets to the Soviets.
For many years, the intellectual left in the United States was skeptical that these
and other individuals were in fact Soviet agents, but decoded Soviet cables and
Soviet archives have now removed any reasonable doubt.19 The “McCarthyism”
that resulted from the Cold War threat is now widely regarded as an overreaction,
but the sense of crisis and danger at the time was nevertheless genuine.
12. In this Cold War context, there were concerns that international human rights
law would develop in ways antithetical to U.S. conceptions of rights and that it
would be used by the Soviet bloc in its ideological campaign against the United
States. This fear appeared to be conﬁrmed when various petitions were ﬁled in
the United Nations during this period concerning racial discrimination in the
United States.20 There were also objections to the inclusion of economic, social,
and cultural rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to the pro-
posal that such rights be included in a binding Covenant. Thus, for example, Frank
Holman, President of the American Bar Association, claimed that the Declaration
and proposed Covenant would “promote state socialism, if not communism,
throughout the world”.21 Another concern was that the developing human rights
project was part of a broader pattern of empowering international institutions –
institutions that were thought likely to be unduly inﬂuenced by the Soviet bloc
17 See above note 1.
18 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History 25–46 (2005).
19 For accounts of the extensive Soviet espionage in the United States during this period, based
on material found in Soviet archives and decoded Soviet cables, see Christopher Andrew &
Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History
of the KGB (1999); John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassilev, Spies: The
Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (2009); and John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr,
Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (1999).
20 See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy
43–45, 63–65 (2000); Azza Salama Layton, International Politics and Civil Rights Policies
in the United States, 1941–1960, at 49–57 (2000).
21 See Natalie Hevener Kaufman, Human Rights Treaties and the Senate: A History of Opposi-
tion 68–69 (1990); see also, e.g., William Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft Covenant
on Human Rights, 37 A.B.A. J. 739 (1951) (raising similar concerns).
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and, relatedly, to place too little value on U.S. conceptions of rights. One of the
objections to the Genocide Convention, for example, was that it seemed to envision
the eventual establishment of an international criminal court, and there was fear that
such a court would not contain the same protections for the defendants as would a
U.S. court.22
III. Features of American Constitutionalism
13. Even the addition of these Cold War considerations provides an incomplete
explanation for the complicated U.S. relationship to human rights treaties.
Among other things, it does not explain why this complicated relationship has con-
tinued even after the end of segregation and the end of the Cold War. To fully
understand this relationship, one must also understand certain features of the
U.S. constitutional system. Five features are particularly relevant: the role of the
Senate in treaty-making, the federal structure of the U.S. government, the stability
of the U.S. constitutional system, the strength and independence of the U.S. judi-
ciary, and the powerful nature of the modern U.S. presidency. Viewed with these
features in mind, the complicated U.S. relationship with human rights treaties is
not merely a holdover from a troubled moment in U.S. history, as some commen-
tators have suggested.23
III.A. Role of the Senate
14. One reason why it is difﬁcult for the United States to commit to human rights
treaties is that, under Article II of the Constitution, treaties require the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate. The constitutional Founders adopted this requirement in
part to protect regional interests in the treaty process.24 This supermajority require-
ment is unusual when compared with other constitutions around the world, most of
which require majority legislative approval.25 The two-thirds senatorial consent
requirement effectively means that a minority of senators – for example, senators
who are particularly concerned about protecting U.S. sovereignty – may have an
ability to block treaties supported by the majority.
15. Despite this constitutional provision, many international agreements con-
cluded by the United States do not go through the supermajority Senate consent
process. Instead, they are concluded as either “congressional-executive agreements”
that involve majority approval from the full Congress, or in some instances as “sole
executive agreements” that involve only unilateral executive action. For example, the
22 See Kaufman, above note 21, at 57.
23 See, e.g., id. at 2 (asserting that “current opposition to human rights treaties is a legacy of the
1950s”).
24 See Hathaway, above note 1, at 1283.
25 See id. at 1272, 1285.
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United States concluded the GATT and NAFTA trade agreements as
congressional-executive agreements. In fact, since the late 1930s, the vast majority
of international agreements concluded by the United States have been concluded
as congressional-executive agreements.26
16. Although some commentators have suggested that the United States should
start using the congressional-executive agreement process for concluding human
rights treaties,27 it is unlikely that such a shift would be politically feasible.
Human rights is one of the few subject areas for which the United States has exclu-
sively used the Article II process.28 Moreover, these treaties have a high political sal-
ience, making it especially likely that the Senate would mobilize in this area to
protect its institutional prerogatives. The Senate has already done this in the area
of arms control, successfully insisting since the 1970s (through bipartisan com-
munications to the President) that all major arms control agreements go through
the supermajority Senate consent process.29
17. Furthermore, even if it were politically feasible to shift to the
congressional-executive agreement process for concluding human rights treaties, such
a shift would raise constitutional issues. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court
held that treaties may regulate domestic matters that are otherwise beyond the scope
of Congress’s authority,30 but this holding probably applies only to treaties concluded
through the Article II process involving supermajority Senate consent.31 One of the
strongest arguments in support of the holding inHolland is that the supermajority sena-
torial consent process speciﬁed inArticle II provides enoughpolitical process protection
for federalism, such that judicial enforcement of federalism is not needed in this
context.32 That argument does not apply to congressional-executive agreements,
however, since they involve the same institutional actors that are involved in enacting
domestic statutes. While Congress has broad domestic authority, especially in regulat-
ing conduct that relates to interstate commerce, human rights treaties likely have
26 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 548
(3d ed. 2009); Hathaway, above note 1, at 1288.
27 See Hathaway, above note 17.
28 See id. at 1261; Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method,
79 Texas LR 961, 1000-02 (2001).
29 See Bradley & Goldsmith, above note 26, at 554–55, 558; Spiro, above note 28, at 996–98.
30 See 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920). That case involved a federal criminal statute that
implemented a treaty designed to protect migratory birds. Prior to the conclusion of the
treaty, two federal district courts had held that Congress lacked the authority to regulate
migratory birds within a state because the birds were part of the state’s sovereign resources.
31 See, e.g., Hathaway, above note 1, at 1339; David Sloss, International Agreements and the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 55 Stanford LR 1963, 1995 (2003).
32 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajority Constitution, 80
Texas LR 703, 761–62 (2002).
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provisions that exceed that broad authority, such as provisions relating to local aspects of
criminal law and procedure.33
18. Nevertheless, while the supermajority consent requirement can make it difﬁ-
cult for the United States to conclude human rights treaties, one should not over-
state the importance of this requirement. As a result of the ﬁlibuster tradition in
the Senate, even ordinary legislation often requires a supermajority approval,
although not quite two-thirds.34 Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the
House of Representatives that makes it more receptive to international human
rights law than the Senate, and, in fact, the House’s more populist orientation
and frequent elections might make it more sensitive to public concerns about
ceding sovereignty in this area. To take one example, in response to Supreme
Court decisions several years ago that cited international and foreign law in
support of broad readings of U.S. constitutional rights protections, a number of
bills and resolutions were proposed in Congress in opposition to this citation prac-
tice, and many of these bills and resolutions originated in the House.35
III.B. Federal Structure
19. Another relevant feature of the U.S. constitutional system is its federal structure.
The United States has not only a national government but also state governments,
each of which has its own legislature, executive branch, and judiciary. The U.S.
Constitution was premised on the idea that the national government was being
granted only limited and enumerated powers, and that some sovereignty would
reside at the state level. This idea is reﬂected in the Tenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution, which provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respect-
ively, or to the people.”36 Concerns about state sovereignty are also reﬂected in the
composition of the U.S. Senate, which consists of two senators from each state,
regardless of the population of the state.
20. International human rights law presents particular challenges for the U.S.
federal system. As noted, the Supreme Court held inMissouri v. Holland that treaties
can regulate matters within the United States that would otherwise be reserved to the
states. International human rights law in turn regulates some matters that would nor-
mally be regulated in the United States at the state and local levels, such as the
33 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Michigan LR 390,
402–05 (1998).
34 Under the Senate’s rules, it takes a three-ﬁfths’ vote to overcome a ﬁlibuster, e.g., 60 out of
100 senators. See Senate Rule XXII(2).
35 See David T. Hutt & Lisa K. Parshall, Divergent Views of the Use of International and
Foreign Law: Congress and the Executive versus the Court, 33 Ohio N. U. LR 113, 125–
31 (2007).
36 U.S. Const. amend. X.
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administration of criminal justice and family law. In addition, unlike in many
countries, treaties can be given direct effect in U.S. courts without the need for legis-
lative implementation. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
treaties are part of the “supreme law of the land” and that state judges shall be bound
by them notwithstanding anything to the contrary in state law.37 While not all treaty
provisions are considered “self-executing” and thus judicially enforceable,38 some
Supreme Court Justices and a California court controversially suggested in the late
1940s that the human rights provisions in the United Nations Charter were self-
executing and thus could preempt conﬂicting state law.39 Moreover, the California
decision looked to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to give
content to these provisions.40 Although vacated on appeal, that decision was fre-
quently cited with alarm during the Bricker Amendment debates.
21. Although often connected to issues of race relations, general concerns about
an erosion of federalism run throughout the mid-twentieth century debates over
human rights treaties. For example, as Duane Tananbaum has noted, opponents
of the Genocide Convention “feared that it would lead to UN involvement in
America’s internal affairs, accelerate federal encroachments on the reserved powers
of the states, and nullify existing state laws”.41 Similarly, an article in the Journal
of the American Bar Association charged that, if the proposed Human Rights Cove-
nant were adopted and made the supreme law of the land, “the traditional distri-
bution of power between governments on the national and state levels would give
way to a unitary state with almost all power therein exercised by the Government
in Washington”.42 A particularly controversial version of the Bricker Amendment
would have overturned Missouri v. Holland by providing that “[a] treaty shall
become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation by
Congress which it could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such
a treaty.”43 Another version would have made treaties non-self-executing and thus
37 U.S. Const. art. VI, para. 2.
38 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508-09 (2008) (concluding that the obligation of
the United States under Article 94 of the United Nations Charter to comply with decisions
of the International Court of Justice to which it is a party is not self-executing); Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829) (concluding that provision in treaty
with Spain concerning land grants was not self-executing).
39 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649 (1948) (Black, J., concurring, joined by
Douglas, J.); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring, joined by Rutledge, J.); Sei Fujii v. State,
217 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950), vacated, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
40 See Sei Fujii, 217 P.2d at 487-88.
41 Tananbaum, above note 13, at 14.
42 Fleming, above note 21, at 798. To respond to the federalism concerns, the U.S. government
unsuccessfully attempted to have a “federal-state” clause included in the proposed Human
Rights Covenant that would have limited U.S. obligations to matters within the federal gov-
ernment’s jurisdiction. See Tananbaum, above note 13, at 17-18.
43 See Kaufman, above note 21, at 30–31.
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have required the full Congress to act before a treaty could be used to preempt state
law.
III.C. Constitutional Stability
22. The stability of the U.S. constitutional system is also a relevant consideration.
The United States has the oldest written constitution in the world. In the more
than 220 years of operation under this constitution, the United States has main-
tained a democratic government in which competing political parties regularly
and peacefully transfer power to each other. The important exception is of course
the Civil War, but even then the national government continued to operate as a
democracy under very trying conditions.
23. This stability means that human rights treaties provide less internal beneﬁt to
the United States than they do to certain other countries. Human rights treaties are
non-reciprocal in that a nation’s incentives to comply with them are not contingent
on the behavior of other nations. Nor does a nation need to ratify a human rights
treaty in order to obtain the beneﬁts of the treaty. It can simply adopt rights protec-
tions for its citizens unilaterally. Nevertheless, nations sometimes ratify human
rights treaties in order to lock in rights protections and thereby reduce the likelihood
of retrenchment when there is a change in regime. This was a particular concern in
some European countries, such as Germany, after World War II.44 This desire to
avoid retrenchment in the face of potential regime change is simply less relevant
to the United States given the stability of its constitutional system. I do not mean
to suggest that the United States gains nothing from joining human rights treaties,
and in fact ultimately the United States decided that it was in its national interest to
ﬁnd a way to do so.45 But the cost-beneﬁt calculus for the United States is likely to
be different than for other countries.
24. In light of the stability of the U.S. constitutional system, human rights treaties can
in fact be seen as endangeringU.S. rights guarantees.The language of these treaties reﬂects
compromises among a diverse arrayof nations that have differing conceptions of rights.46
Inevitably, therefore, the rights guaranteeswill differ from those in theUnited States, and
not always in ways that would be regarded in theUnited States as a progressive direction.
The protections for freedom of speech and criminal process, for example, are higher in
the United States than in many other countries. There was therefore a concern that the
44 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origin of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 Int’l Org. 217 (2000).
45 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 Pennsylvania LR 399, 414 (2000).
46 See, e.g., David P. Stewart, United States Ratiﬁcation of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Signiﬁcance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DePaul
LR 1183, 1207 (1993) (“By deﬁnition, the negotiation of multilateral treaties between states
with widely differing legal systems produces compromises and ambiguities.”).
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proposed Human Rights Covenant “could be employed to justify restrictions on rights
and freedoms that would otherwise be unconstitutional”.47
25. This concern was heightened by language in theMissouri v. Holland decision.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution refers to federal statutes being “made in
pursuance” of the Constitution, whereas it refers to treaties as simply being “made
under the authority of the United States”.48 InHolland, the Court noted that “[i]t is
open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the
formal acts prescribed to make the convention”49 — that is, the approval of the pre-
sident and two-thirds of the Senate. To some, the Court’s “hint that there may be no
other test to be applied than whether the treaty has been duly concluded indicates
that the Court might hold that speciﬁc constitutional limitations in favor of individ-
ual liberty and property are not applicable to deprivations wrought by treaties”.50
This possibility was frequently noted by critics of the emerging international
human rights project,51 and many versions of the Bricker Amendment included a
provision making clear that treaties had to comply with the Constitution in order
to operate as supreme law of the land. The need for such clariﬁcation was
reduced in 1957, however, when a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that,
notwithstanding Holland, “no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power
on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the
restraints of the Constitution.”52 But this decision does not entirely remove the
concern that international human rights law might negatively affect how U.S. con-
stitutional rights are interpreted.53
III.D. Strong and Independent Judiciary
26. Another relevant feature of the U.S. constitutional system is its strong and inde-
pendent national judiciary. Since early in its history, the judiciary has asserted the
power of judicial review, which means that it has the authority to apply the Consti-
tution, including the rights guarantees of the Constitution, to invalidate the actions
of the other branches of the government, as well as those of the states.54 The federal
47 Tananbaum, above note 13, at 20.
48 U.S. Const. art. VI.
49 252 U.S. at 433.
50 Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 Michigan LR 1, 13 (1920).
51 See, e.g., Frank E. Holman, Treaty Law-Making, 25 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B. J. 382, 390
(1950).
52 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (plurality). As the plurality explained, the reason that
the Supremacy Clause does not refer to treaties being made pursuant to the Constitution was
so that treaties that the United States had already entered into before the Constitution would
operate as supreme federal law. See id. at 16–17.
53 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human Rights
Law, 84 Notre Dame LR 1739, 1748–50 (2009).
54 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–80 (1803).
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courts are also open to hear a wide array of issues, even on sensitive questions of
social policy. As Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed in his commentaries
about the United States, “[t]here is hardly a political question in the United
States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”55 Moreover, the
federal judges have lifetime appointments and thus are insulated from political
pressure. The federal court system has been operating since the beginning of the
country and has developed a large body of precedent, including precedent interpret-
ing U.S. rights guarantees.
27. A contemporary illustration of the broad role of the judiciary in the United
States is provided by the Supreme Court’s decisions relating to the post-September
11, 2001 “war on terrorism”. To date, the Court has determined the minimum pro-
cedures that must be used in evaluating which terrorist detainees can be held by the
military, has asserted jurisdiction over the detention facility at the U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and has invalidated a military trial system established by
the Executive Branch.56 The Court has made clear in these decisions that,
“[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in
its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conﬂict,
it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake.”57
28. The existence of a strong and independent judiciary in the United States is
relevant to the U.S. relationship with human rights treaties for several reasons.
First, as with the stability of the U.S. constitutional system, the existence of a
strong judiciary creates less internal need for human rights treaties and related inter-
national enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. judiciary already addresses human
rights protections, and it does so in a stronger way than would be possible
through international institutions. Second, the existence of an independent judi-
ciary presents more uncertainties for the United States about the effects of the trea-
ties, since the courts are likely to exercise substantial interpretive discretion.58 As
Beth Simmons has documented, common law countries tend to be more reluctant
to ratify human rights treaties for precisely this reason.59 Third, because U.S. courts
are generally open to hear most issues, and because the human rights treaties will
inevitably use language that differs from U.S. domestic law, these treaties pose a
55 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 270 (George Lawrence transl. 1969).
56 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
57 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality).
58 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic
Law?, 1 Chicago JIL 327, 332 (2000) (“[A] domesticated ICCPR would generate enormous
litigation and uncertainty, potentially changing domestic civil rights law in manifold ways.”).
59 See Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics
71-77, 109 (2009).
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danger of generating substantial litigation and uncertainty. Fourth, a strong and
independent domestic judiciary can increase the domestic inﬂuence of international
institutions. Many human rights treaties establish interpretive bodies and call for
adjudication before the International Court of Justice. The “sovereignty cost” associ-
ated with assigning authority to these international institutions increases if there is a
possibility that domestic courts will adopt or defer to their decisions and
interpretations.60
29. In short, because of its legal system, ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties is
more costly for the United States than for some other countries. Importantly,
these costs exist even when the United States supports the basic substance of the trea-
ties, as it generally does. As Oona Hathaway explains:
Governments that anticipate that domestic actors may force them to change their
behavior to abide by a treaty are likely to expect to be more constrained by their
treaty commitments. This can be true even if the government supports the sub-
stance of the treaty, because it has the effect of removing discretionary power from
the executive and handing it to the legislature, which is often charged with imple-
menting the treaty, and the judiciary, which is charged with interpreting it.61
Such restraint on discretion is likely to give U.S. governmental actors pause in decid-
ing whether and how to ratify human rights treaties.
III.E. Powerful Modern Presidency
30. Still another relevant feature of the U.S. constitutional system is the powerful
nature of its modern presidency. Unlike in parliamentary systems, the executive
in the United States operates separately from the legislature. Because of the
ability of the executive branch to act quickly, in relative secrecy, and with a
unitary voice, it is functionally the best actor to conduct U.S. foreign relations.
As the United States became a major world power in the twentieth century, there-
fore, the power of the presidency inevitably grew. In addition, the development of
the U.S. economy in this period combined with efforts to combat the Great
Depression of the 1930s resulted in a large growth in administrative agencies that
are within or connected to the executive branch. The need to maintain uniﬁed
and secretive control over nuclear weapons and related national security programs
further bolstered the executive’s authority.62
60 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 437–39 (2000) (describing sovereignty costs associated
with delegations of authority to international institutions).
61 Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. Conﬂict
Res. 588, 593 (2007).
62 See Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State
(2010).
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31. At the same time that international human rights law was being developed,
the increased power of the presidency prompted concerns within the United
States about an erosion of separation of powers. These concerns were particularly
salient during the Cold War, a time when George Orwell’s novel 1984 captured
the fears of many about where the world was headed. Conservatives in the U.S.
Senate were particularly unhappy with the concessions that President Roosevelt
had unilaterally made to the Soviet Union, ﬁrst in the Litvinov Assignment in
the 1930s and then at the Yalta conference in 1945.63 The Truman Administration
was viewed as continuing this pattern of unilateral executive authority with the
Potsdam Accord in 1945, the commitment of military force to Korea in 1950,
and the seizure of the nation’s steel mills in 1952 in response to a threatened
strike in that industry. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was viewed
by some as connected to this concern, since it was agreed to by the Executive
Branch without congressional involvement.
32. Even though human rights treaties require senatorial advice and consent, they
implicate concerns about the growth of presidential power for several reasons. First, by
longstanding tradition, the U.S. treaty process is such that only the Executive Branch
is involved in the negotiation, and the Senate is simply presented with a ﬁnished
product.64 Second, many multilateral treaties, including human rights treaties, estab-
lish international institutions or are subject to interpretation by such institutions, and
the U.S. representative in such institutions is typically from the Executive Branch.
Third, the phenomenon of “sole executive agreements” means that there is some
danger that presidents will conclude agreements without even seeking the advice
and consent of the Senate, as both Roosevelt and Truman demonstrated.65
33. Much of the debate over the Bricker Amendment in fact concerned presiden-
tial power. Proponents of the Amendment were concerned that treaties might be
construed as broadening the president’s authority, a concern illustrated by the
Truman Administration’s claim that it derived authority to engage in the war in
63 See Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, at 493-94, 524
(2002). Alger Hiss, a covert Soviet agent, was part of the U.S. delegation at Yalta, where
he worked on issues relating to the establishment of the United Nations. See Andrew &
Mitrokhin, above note 19, at 133. He went on to serve as the acting Secretary-General of
the organizing conference of the United Nations. See id. at 134. See also G. Edward
White, Alger Hiss’s Looking Glass Wars: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy (2004) (exploring
Hiss’s life both before and after his perjury conviction).
64 The constitutional Founders envisioned that the Senate would act as an advisory body during
the treaty process, but U.S. practice did not develop that way. See Curtis A. Bradley &Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Michigan LR 545, 626–
36 (2004).
65 See generally Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77
N.C. L. Rev. 133 (1998) (discussing the phenomenon of sole executive agreements and
arguing for limitations on the president’s authority to conclude and create domestic law
through such agreements).
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Korea from treaties,66 and by the argument from the dissenting justices in the
Youngstown steel seizure case that treaties provided support for the president’s
actions.67 Some versions of the Bricker Amendment were also targeted speciﬁcally
at the phenomenon of sole executive agreements, and in fact it was one such version
that came within a vote of passing in the Senate.
IV. Accommodating the Concerns
34. Both the Truman Administration and the Eisenhower Administration
attempted to simultaneously stay engaged with the international human rights
project while addressing the various areas of concern. The Truman Administration
emphasized that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not binding.68 It
also insisted, over objections by the Soviet bloc, that the proposed Human Rights
Covenant be divided into two treaties, one addressing civil and political rights
and the other addressing the more controversial economic and social rights.69 In
an effort to persuade the Senate to accept the proposed Genocide Convention, sup-
porters of the Convention proposed a package of reservations, understandings, and
declarations (“RUDs”) to address concerns.70
35. These efforts did not appease the critics. Ultimately, as part of its effort to
defeat the Bricker Amendment proposals, the Eisenhower Administration assured
the Senate that the United States would not become a party to the emerging inter-
national human rights treaties. In 1953, the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
explained to the Senate that the Administration did “not intend to become a party
to any such covenant or present it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate”.71 The
United States similarly informed the UN Commission on Human Rights that “the
United States Government has reached the conclusion that we should not at this
time become a party to any multilateral treaty such as those contemplated in the
draft Covenants on Human Rights, and that we should now work toward the objec-
tives of the [Universal] Declaration by other means.”72 Two years later, Dulles reaf-
ﬁrmed that “the United States will not sign or become a party to the covenants on
66 See Jane E. Stromseth, Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the
Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. Miami LR 145, 153 (1995).
67 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 668-70 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting).
68 See Tananbaum, above note 13, at 10-11.
69 See Kaufman, above note 21, at 76.
70 See id. at 60-62; Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide
65-70 (2002).
71 Statement of Secretary of State Dulles, in Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., at 825 (1953).
72 13 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 668 (1968) (quoting letter dated
April 3, 1953, from Secretary of State Dulles to U.S. representative on the Commission).
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human rights, the convention on the political rights of women, and certain other
proposed multilateral agreements”.73
36. The Kennedy administration would later send three of the least controversial
human rights treaties to the Senate for its consideration: the Supplementary Slavery
Convention, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, and the Conven-
tion Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor. The Senate eventually gave its
advice and consent to the Supplementary Slavery Convention in 1967 during the
Johnson Administration, and it gave its advice and consent to the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women in 1975 during the Ford Administration. The
former convention simply extended a treaty to which the United States had long
been a party, and, as for the latter, “supporters pointed out that accession would
mandate no changes in U.S. law and would cost nothing”.74 The United States
did not ratify the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor until
1991, during the Administration of the George H.W. Bush.
37. In the 1970s, President Carter, who made human rights one of the signature
elements of his administration, sought to persuade the Senate to approve some of
the more high-proﬁle human rights treaties. In 1978, his Administration sent the
following four human rights treaties to the Senate for its consideration: the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; and the American Convention on Human Rights.
In 1980, it added the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women. Importantly, the Carter Administration also included
with each of these treaties a proposed package of RUDs designed to address poten-
tial senatorial objections.
38. Despite this effort, the United States did not begin to ratify any of the high-
proﬁle human rights treaties until near the end of the Reagan Administration in the
late 1980s, when it ﬁnally ratiﬁed the Genocide Convention. In the 1990s, the
United States proceeded to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination; and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. For each of these treaties, the Senate
included a package of RUDs as a condition of its advice and consent.75 The
73 32 Dep’t St. Bull. 820, 822 (1955); see also Caroline Pruden, Conditional Partners: Eisen-
hower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace 202 (1998) (“Eisenhower
and his key advisers realized that only by disassociating the administration from the Human
Rights Covenants could they hope to weaken support for the Bricker Amendment.”).
74 Kaufman, above note 21, at 145.
75 For the text of the RUDs, see University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, “U.S. Reser-
vations, Declarations, and Understandings to Human Rights Treaties,” at http://www1.
umn.edu/ humanrts/usdocs/usres.html.
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United States still has not ratiﬁed other high-proﬁle human rights treaties, such as
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, even though a large majority of
nations have ratiﬁed these treaties. If and when the United States does ratify these
treaties, it will almost certainly include a package of RUDs as a condition of its
consent.76
39. The RUDs can be grouped into six categories, each of which has a connection
to the constitutional features discussed above. First, there are a few provisions
designed to avoid a conﬂict with U.S. rights guarantees. An illustration of this
type of provision is the reservation that the United States attached to its ratiﬁcation
of the ICCPR concerning restrictions on speech. Article 20 of the ICCPR requires
that nations prohibit “propaganda for war”, as well as “[a]ny advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence”. Depending on how this article is construed, it might conﬂict with free
speech rights under the U.S. Constitution.77 As a result, the United States attached
a reservation to its ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR stating that “Article 20 does not auth-
orize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict
the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of
the United States”.
40. Second, there are provisions designed to clarify particular treaty terms or
announce how the United States will construe them, which are designed in part
to reduce the possibility that courts will interpret the terms in unintended ways.
In ratifying the Genocide Convention, for example, the United States included
an “understanding” stating that “the term ‘mental harm’ in Article II(b) means per-
manent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or similar tech-
niques”. This understanding addresses a concern, ﬁrst raised in the 1950s, that
the Convention’s reference to mental harm could be interpreted to extend the Con-
vention’s reach to mere acts of discrimination. Another example of an interpretive
understanding concerned Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR, which prohibit dis-
crimination not only on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, [and] birth”, but also on the
76 See, e.g., Luisa Blanchﬁeld, CRS Report for Congress: The Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Congressional Issues, at CRS-4 (Dec. 14,
2006) (noting that the Clinton Administration included a package of RUDs when submit-
ting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women to
the Senate); Luisa Blanchﬁeld, CRS Report for Congress: The United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Background and Policy Issues, at 6 (April 1, 2009) (noting that,
when the Clinton Administration contemplated submitting the Convention on the Rights of
the Child to the Senate, it planned to include a package of proposed RUDs).
77 See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in American Exceptionalism and
Human Rights, above note 5, at 36.
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basis of any “other status”. The United States attached an understanding to its rati-
ﬁcation of the ICCPR stating that this open-ended prohibition on discrimination
did not preclude legal distinctions between persons “when such distinctions are,
at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective”.
41. Third, the United States has generally included “non-self-execution” declara-
tions with its ratiﬁcation of human rights treaties.78 These declarations are designed
to prevent the treaties from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of imple-
menting legislation, thereby leaving to Congress the task of making any necessary
changes to U.S. law. As Jack Goldsmith and I have explained, the U.S. treatymakers
have justiﬁed these declarations on several grounds:
First, they believe that, taking into account the substantive reservations and inter-
pretive conditions, U.S. domestic laws and remedies are sufﬁcient to meet U.S.
obligations under human rights treaties. There is thus no additional need, in
their view, for domestic implementation. Second, there is concern that the treaty
terms, although similar in substance to U.S. law, are not identical in wording
and thus might have a destabilizing effect on domestic rights protections if con-
sidered self-executing. Third, there is disagreement about which treaty terms, if
any, would be self-executing. The declaration is intended to provide certainty
about this issue in advance of litigation. Finally, the treatymakers believe that if
there is to be a change in the scope of domestic rights protections, it should be
done by legislation with the participation of the House of Representatives.79
42. By avoiding the danger that courts will interpret the treaty provisions differently
than intended by the political branches, or in a way that will create uncertainty about
domestic rights guarantees, these declarations reduce the domestic costs of the treaties
to the United States, making them easier to ratify. While the declarations have gen-
erated academic controversy, the courts have consistently deferred to them.80
43. Fourth, when consenting to human rights treaties, the U.S. Senate has gen-
erally issued “federalism understandings”. These understandings state that the
federal government shall implement the treaty “to the extent that it exercises legis-
lative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention and
otherwise by the state and local governments”. In supporting the adoption of this
understanding for the ICCPR, the George H.W. Bush Administration explained
that the understanding “serves to emphasize domestically that there is no intent
to alter the constitutional balance of authority between the State and Federal
78 The United States did not include such a declaration when it ratiﬁed the Genocide Conven-
tion, but the Senate did declare that the President was not to deposit the U.S. instrument of
ratiﬁcation until after Congress had enacted implementing legislation for the Convention.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, above note 45, at 419 n.97.
79 Id. at 420 n.97.
80 See Bradley & Goldsmith, above note 26, at 521.
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governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to ‘federalize’ matters now
within the competence of the States”.81 These understandings are not intended
to alter U.S. obligations under the treaties. Rather, as David Stewart (a former
State Department attorney) notes, they “concern[] the steps to be taken domestically
by the respective federal and state authorities”.82
44. Fifth, like a number of other countries, the United States has reserved out of
“ICJ Clauses” in the human rights treaties, whereby the International Court of
Justice would have jurisdiction to hear disputes arising between nations under the
treaties. For example, the United States attached a reservation to its ratiﬁcation of
the Genocide Convention stating that, “before any dispute to which the United
States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice under this article, the speciﬁc consent of the United States is required
in each case”. Concerns in the United States about ICJ jurisdiction, evident in
the early 1950s, have grown over time, with the ICJ’s exercise of jurisdiction in
the Nicaragua case in the 1980s (concerning U.S. military activities) and, more
recently, with the ICJ’s decisions in several various death penalty cases involving
U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.83
45. Finally, a few provisions decline to consent to particular treaty terms for
policy reasons. An illustration is the reservation that the United States attached to
its ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR concerning the juvenile death penalty. One of the pro-
visions in Article 6 of the ICCPR disallows the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age. Until fairly recently, some
states in the United States allowed for the execution of individuals who committed
murder if they were at least sixteen years old at the time of the offense.84 There are
signiﬁcant debates within the United States concerning the death penalty, and the
United States has consistently maintained that it wants to address the issue through
the normal democratic process rather than through international law. As a result, the
United States attached a reservation to its ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR stating that it
was not agreeing to the ban on the juvenile death penalty. The United States also
81 Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 103–23, at 18 (1992).
82 Stewart, above note 46, at 1202.
83 In response to the ICJ’s assertion of jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case, the United States
withdrew its acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction. In response to the Vienna Con-
vention cases, the United States withdrew from an optional protocol to the Vienna Conven-
tion that gave the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Convention.
84 The U.S. Supreme Court held in 2005 that the execution of juvenile offenders violates the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits the inﬂiction of “cruel and
unusual punishments”. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In its decision, the
Court cited provisions in human rights treaties that disallowed the juvenile death penalty
and noted that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and signiﬁcant conﬁrmation for our own conclusions”.
Id. at 576-77.
340 Chinese JIL (2010)
stated when ratifying the Torture Convention that “it is the understanding of the
United States that international law does not prohibit the death penalty, and
does not consider this Convention to restrict or prohibit the United States from
applying the death penalty consistent with the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States”.
V. Empty Symbolism or Lawyerly Care?
46. Critics contend that, as a result of the RUDs, the U.S. ratiﬁcation of human
rights treaties is merely empty symbolism. As Professor Henkin explains, “[b]y
adhering to human rights conventions subject to these reservations, the United
States, it is charged, is pretending to assume international obligations but in fact
is undertaking nothing.”85 In its strongest form, the charge is that the U.S. relation-
ship with human rights treaties is disingenuous or hypocritical.86
47. There are a number of problems with this charge.87 Even with the RUDs, the
United States has bound itself to the vast majority of the provisions in the treaties it
has ratiﬁed. In addition, it has enacted domestic civil, criminal, and immigration
laws to implement the Genocide and Torture Conventions.88 Although it has not
enacted legislation to implement the ICCPR or the Race Convention, that is
because it has determined that its existing constitutional and statutory law already
satisﬁes the requirements of those Conventions, once the RUDs are taken into
account. Importantly, critics who complain about the lack of U.S. implementing
legislation do not typically show that existing law is inconsistent with the treaties.
It is also worth noting that many other nations, including a number of other
liberal democracies, have similarly not made the ICCPR part of their domestic
law.89 In addition, even when the United States is relying on existing legal
85 Henkin, above note 1, at 344; see also, e.g., Ignatieff, above note 5, at 6 (“[W]ith a few excep-
tions, American ratiﬁcation renders U.S. participation in international human rights sym-
bolic, since adopting treaties does not actually improve the statutory rights protections of
U.S. citizens in domestic law.”); Kaufman, above note 21, at 197 (“[T]he package of attach-
ments [to human rights treaties] makes a mockery of the international human rights consen-
sus reﬂected in the treaties.”); Power, above note 70, at 16 (“These interpretations of and
disclaimers about the genocide convention had the effect of immunizing the United States
from being charged with genocide but in so doing they also rendered the U.S. ratiﬁcation
a symbolic act.”).
86 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stanford LR 1479, 1486–
87 (2003).
87 Some of the discussion below is drawn from Bradley & Goldsmith, above note 45, at 456-67.
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (torture); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note
(immigration).
89 See Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through
UN Human Rights Committee Documents, 22 Human Rights Q. 187, 193 (2000).
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protections to satisfy its obligations, it is still assuming an international legal obli-
gation not to retreat from these protections. The United States also has opened
itself to comment and criticism from the international committees that administer
these treaties. Consistent with the latter obligation, the United States has ﬁled a
number of reports with the various committees and has appeared before them to
defend its practices.
48. Furthermore, the United States is hardly alone in attaching qualiﬁcations to
its consent to the human rights treaties. Approximately a third of the parties to the
ICCPR, for example, have qualiﬁed their consent with reservations, understandings,
and declarations.90 Moreover, empirical assessments have shown that liberal democ-
racies, and common law countries in particular, tend to attach the most reservations
to human rights treaties.91 Nor do the non-self-execution declarations reduce the
binding effect of the treaties on the United States under international law.
Instead, they relate only to how the United States will implement the treaties intern-
ally. Moreover, in many countries, treaties, including human rights treaties, are never
self-executing.92 Finally, the U.S. treaty practice, which involves conditional consent
to some treaties and non-ratiﬁcation of others, does not involve any obvious hypoc-
risy. As Jack Goldsmith has noted, the charge of hypocrisy “is too casually made”,
since the United States generally does not insist that other nations comply with
human rights norms that the United States has not accepted.93
49. It is true that the United States is in limited company in having failed to ratify
certain of the human rights treaties. A particularly dramatic example is the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratiﬁed by all the countries in the
world (albeit often with reservations) except for the United States and Somalia.94
This treaty, however, raises signiﬁcant federalism concerns for the United States,
since it addresses subjects that have long been regulated in the United States primar-
ily at the state and local levels. As David Stewart explains:
90 See Yogesh Tyagi, The Conﬂict of Law and Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Trea-
ties, 71 BYBIL 181, 187 n.18 (2000).
91 See Simmons, above note 59, at 102; Jack L. Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human
Rights RUDs, 3 Univ. St. Thomas LJ 311, 314 (2005); Eric Neumayer, Qualiﬁed Ratiﬁca-
tion: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights Treaties, 36 J. Legal Stud. 397,
420 (2007).
92 See Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach to Treaty Law and Practice, in National
Treaty Law and Practice 1, 40–47 (2005).
93 Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double Standard, 1
Green Bag 2d 365, 371 (1998).
94 The United States has, however, ratiﬁed two optional protocols to the Convention, one relat-
ing to the involvement of children in armed conﬂict, and the other relating to the sale of chil-
dren, child prostitution, and child pornography. For each protocol, the United States
included an understanding making clear that it was not assuming any obligations under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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To a much greater extent than other human rights treaties recently endorsed by
the Senate, this Convention addresses areas traditionally considered to be primar-
ily or exclusive within the province of state and local authority, such as measures
for child health, development and protection, custody and visitation, adoption
and foster care, and education and welfare.95
50. The vagueness of some of the terms of this Convention also has generated con-
cerns in the United States, given its strong and independent judiciary. For example,
the treaty refers to various children’s rights, such as rights of privacy and association,
without specifying whether such rights apply only against the state or also against
parents. If the latter, there would be a signiﬁcant danger that it could be applied
in a way that would interfere with the traditional parent-child relationship.96
51. While one can of course criticize aspects of the U.S. treaty practice on policy
grounds, there is nothing about it that is inherently disrespectful of international
law, as some critics have contended. Indeed, in some ways this practice actually
shows more respect for the human rights treaties than the practices of many other
nations. The United States carefully assesses each treaty and determines which pro-
visions it can legally and politically accept, and it attempts to avoid making commit-
ments that it will have difﬁculty honoring. The United States exercises this care
when ratifying human rights treaties precisely because, unlike some countries, it
does not treat such ratiﬁcation as a merely symbolic act. As Senator Moynihan
explained in urging ratiﬁcation of the ICCPR with the package of RUDs, the
United States “has undertaken a meticulous examination of U.S. practice to
insure that the United States will in fact comply with the obligations that it is assum-
ing”, which “can certainly be viewed as an indication of the seriousness with which
the obligations are regarded rather than as an expression of disdain for the obli-
gations”.97 While the United States has also resisted giving the human rights treaties
direct effect under its domestic law, this does not distinguish it from many other
nations, and there is no obligation under international law to make treaties self-
executing. Nor is the United States obligated to change its domestic law after ratify-
ing a human rights treaty if its existing law is already in compliance with the treaty.
95 David P. Stewart, Ratiﬁcation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 Geo. J. on
Fighting Poverty 161, 176 (1998).
96 See id. at 173-76. The United States is also one of a handful of countries that has not ratiﬁed
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). The current Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, has stated that “[t]he Obama
Administration will continue to work for the ratiﬁcation of CEDAW.” Hilary Rodham
Clinton, Remarks at the UN Commission on the Status of Women (Mar. 12, 2010), at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138320.htm. It is not clear, however, when
the Administration will seek the Senate’s advice and consent. If the United States does
ratify this Convention, it seems likely that it will include a package of RUDs with its
ratiﬁcation.
97 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
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VI. Conclusion
52. The complicated U.S. relationship with human rights treaties cannot be dis-
missed as a mere holdover from a troubled moment in history. Rather, this relation-
ship stems in part from more enduring features of the U.S. constitutional system.
These features help to explain, among other things, the variety of RUDs that the
United States has attached (and presumably will continue to attach) to its ratiﬁca-
tion of human rights treaties. While there has been extensive academic criticism of
the RUDs, it is important to keep in mind that they have had bipartisan support in
both the Executive Branch and the Senate, and that they helped make U.S. ratiﬁca-
tion of human rights treaties politically feasible. Moreover, even with the RUDs, the
United States has bound itself to the vast majority of provisions in the treaties it has
ratiﬁed, and it has subjected itself to international scrutiny and monitoring. The
United States also has extensive human rights protections in its domestic law,
and a judiciary willing and able to enforce them.
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